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Tinker Takes on Tatro: The Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
Missed Opportunity 
I. Introduction 
The First Amendment rights of public school students have long been 
respected and defended. The Supreme Court has declared that “[t]he 
vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in 
the community of American schools.”1 This protection is especially true 
with regard to public universities, which have long been considered the 
“‘marketplace of ideas.’”2 However, the development of social media, 
while arguably a positive educational tool, has greatly complicated First 
Amendment jurisprudence. Social media sites such as Facebook, MySpace, 
and Twitter have allowed for the rapid dissemination of thoughts and 
expressions that were once private and personal. Often, these expressions 
are deeply disturbing and place school administrators concerned about 
student safety on high alert. 
University administrators may certainly act when safety is a genuine 
concern. School officials need not sit back and wait for violence to erupt. 
However, administrators must work within the confines of constitutional 
boundaries in order to maintain the balance between First Amendment 
freedoms and student safety. In Tatro v. University of Minnesota, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court missed an opportunity to correct the court of 
appeal’s misunderstanding and provide guidance to universities attempting 
to maintain this balance.3 In evaluating social media speech by a college 
student, the Minnesota Court of Appeals bypassed the true threat standard 
and instead relied on the Tinker substantial disruption test to punish student 
speech.4 It failed to realize that the Tinker standard only constrains a 
university’s ability to act when student safety is a concern. Simultaneously, 
the court’s dismissive consideration of the true threat test failed to 
comprehend the standard’s true potential. 
Instead of correcting the court of appeals, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
affirmed the decision on different, narrower grounds and avoided 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960). 
 2. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972). 
 3. See 816 N.W.2d 509, 524 (Minn. 2012). 
 4. See Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811, 821 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d on 
other grounds, 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012). 
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distinguishing between the true threat and Tinker tests.5 The state supreme 
court determined that the university’s discipline was justified because the 
student violated a professional program’s rules of conduct.6 By deciding the 
case on narrow grounds, the Minnesota Supreme Court opted not to provide 
guidance to university administrators currently struggling to deal with the 
friction between First Amendment freedoms and student safety. 
This note contains three main arguments. First, it argues that the Tinker 
standard should not be applicable at the university level because the United 
States Supreme Court formulated it with primary and secondary students in 
mind and premised it on the in loco parentis theory. Second, pure 
application of Tinker demands a narrow focus that severely constrains a 
school’s ability to act; thus, it is counterproductive to university interests 
when safety is a concern. Third, the true threat test is the appropriate 
standard for college speech. The standard allows for a predictive, 
multifactor analysis that makes quick, decisive action possible. 
Furthermore, despite misconceptions, the true threat standard is inherently 
proactive and allows for preventative measures. 
Part II of this note discusses the law before Tatro, focusing on the Tinker 
decision and the substantial disruption test, as well as how subsequent 
courts have attempted to predict substantial disruptions. Part II also 
discusses the true threat standard in public schools, recent precedent 
regarding off-campus Internet speech in high schools, and the role of the 
First Amendment in public universities. Part III provides an overview of the 
facts and holdings in Tatro. Part IV asserts that when safety is a concern, 
colleges should rely on the true threat standard, not the substantial 
disruption test. Specifically, Part IV argues that Tinker should not be 
applicable at the university level, pure application of the substantial 
disruption test is counterproductive to university interests, and the true 
threat standard’s multifactor analysis and proactive focus can adequately 
meet university needs. 
II. Legal Background 
Two predominant tests have emerged for determining the proper scope 
of First Amendment rights in public schools. The Tinker standard requires a 
substantial disruption, foreseeability of a substantial disruption, or an 
invasion of the rights of others before a school may act to restrict speech.7 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 524. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1969). 
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Recently, the Third Circuit sitting en banc indicated that the Tinker standard 
is not satisfied when applied to off-campus Internet speech.8 
The second predominant standard is the true threat test, which analyzes 
numerous factors including context, the conditional nature of the alleged 
threat, and whether the threat was made in the course of political debate.9 
The true threat test also considers “whether a reasonable person would 
foresee that the statement would be interpreted . . . as a serious expression 
of intent to harm or assault.”10 When evaluating college speech and 
determining which standard applies, the legal community must 
acknowledge that minor students and college students have historically 
been granted different degrees of First Amendment protection in public 
schools. 
A. The Substantial Disruption Test: Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District and Its Exceptions 
In 1969, the Supreme Court issued its watershed opinion regarding 
students’ First Amendment rights in public high schools.11 In Tinker, 
administrators suspended two high school students and a junior high student 
for wearing black armbands as symbols of opposition to the Vietnam War.12 
The district court dismissed their father’s prayer for an injunction, the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed when it was equally divided sitting en banc, and the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.13 Perhaps the most cited 
phrase regarding student speech to date is the declaration that “[i]t can 
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”14 
                                                                                                                 
 8. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 929-31 (3d Cir. 
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012) (en banc) (finding that the Tinker substantial 
disruption test was not met because the student-created profile was made private and did not 
target the school); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d 
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012) (en banc) (affirming that a school could not 
punish a student for a profile created off-campus while noting that “[i]t would be an 
unseemly and dangerous precedent to allow the state, in the guise of school authorities, to 
reach into a child’s home and control his/her actions there to the same extent that it can 
control that child when he/she participates in school sponsored activities”);  
 9. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam). 
 10. Lovell ex rel. Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(quoting United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 11. See Tinker, 393 U.S. 503. 
 12. Id. at 504. 
 13. Id. at 504-05, 514. 
 14. Id. at 506. 
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However, the Court also explained that First Amendment rights must be 
“applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.”15 
The Court held that the school punished the students for “silent, passive 
expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance.”16 
The expression did not interfere with the school’s work or collide “with the 
rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone.”17 While some 
students made hostile remarks, the work of the school was not disrupted.18 
The Court held that even if concerns regarding potential disruption existed, 
undifferentiated fear or apprehension would not suffice.19 A school need not 
wait for disruption to occur, but more than a “desire to avoid the discomfort 
and unpleasantness” is necessary to punish speech.20 Thus, the test was 
established: a public high school may not punish student speech unless the 
speech substantially interferes with the work of the school or intrudes upon 
the rights of others.21 Furthermore, predictions regarding disruption must 
meet a high threshold and be based on more than mere fear or 
apprehension.22 
Since Tinker, several narrow exceptions have emerged. In Bethel School 
District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Supreme Court held that a high school may 
prohibit speech that is lewd, indecent, offensive, or vulgar because such 
speech interferes with the school’s duty to instill students with values 
central to citizenship and civility.23 In Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier, the Court held that a high school may censor speech in a school-
sponsored newspaper if the censorship is “reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns.”24 Finally, in Morse v. Frederick, the Court held that 
a high school may prohibit student speech at a school-sponsored event 
when the speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.25 
  
                                                                                                                 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 508. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 509. 
 21. Id. at 514. 
 22. Id. at 509, 514. 
 23. 478 U.S. 675, 683, 685-86 (1986). 
 24. 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
 25. 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007). 
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B. Predicting a Substantial Disruption in Public Schools 
The Tinker decision did not explicitly discuss what factors a court should 
look to when attempting to predict a substantial disruption. Thus, lower 
courts have been free to develop the standard, and a wide array of 
approaches has emerged. In West v. Derby Unified School District No. 260, 
the Tenth Circuit considered whether a middle school was justified in 
punishing a student for drawing the Confederate flag during class.26 The 
court found that the school could reasonably predict disruption under Tinker 
because the same symbol had led to violence in the past.27 A Confederate 
flag headband had incited a fight, and drawings of the symbol on notebooks 
and students’ arms had led to incidents.28 In fact, the school board had 
passed the school’s racial harassment and intimidation policy in direct 
response to these incidents, prohibiting racially divisive depictions.29 
In Barr v. Lafon, the Sixth Circuit faced a similar predicament when a 
principal forced a high school student to cover his Confederate flag shirt in 
order to comply with the school’s dress code.30 Although the Confederate 
flag itself had not yet led to outright violence at the school, the Sixth Circuit 
found that the prevalence of racially motivated slurs, graffiti, and 
circulating “hit lists” justified the school’s prediction of disruption.31 The 
“hit lists” alone had already caused educational disruption because they led 
to calls from parents, as well as parents showing up at the school.32 
Furthermore, African American students had begun to miss school on 
account of fear, and a lockdown had to be implemented due to the threat of 
racial violence.33 The Sixth Circuit emphasized that, in Tinker, no evidence 
in the record would have led authorities to forecast a substantial 
disruption.34 In contrast, the record in Barr justified the prediction.35 
In LaVine v. Blaine School District, the Ninth Circuit held that a 
student’s poem vividly describing a school shooting could potentially lead 
to a substantial disruption.36 The student had a history of disciplinary 
                                                                                                                 
 26. See 206 F.3d 1358, 1361 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 27. Id. at 1366. 
 28. Id. at 1362. 
 29. Id. 
 30. 538 F.3d 554, 560 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 31. Id. at 566-67. 
 32. Id. at 566. 
 33. Id. at 567. 
 34. Id. at 566. 
 35. Id. 
 36. 257 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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problems, and the school was aware that he was reportedly stalking an ex-
girlfriend.37 Furthermore, the student’s family history, psychological 
problems, and recent school shootings in nearby cities were all relevant 
factors in predicting a substantial disruption.38 
Determining whether Internet speech will disrupt the school environment 
complicates the analysis because the immediate context is often not 
apparent. In Doninger v. Niehoff, a high school student wrote an angry blog 
entry after the school faculty allegedly cancelled a much-anticipated 
concert.39 She posted the message on a website that was unaffiliated with 
the school; however, the student’s message was publicly accessible.40 The 
blog urged fellow students to confront faculty members regarding the 
cancellation.41 The student even testified that the purpose of the blog entry 
was to encourage others to take action.42 The Second Circuit held that a 
substantial disruption was foreseeable given the call to action.43 Similarly, 
in Boucher v. School Board of the School District of Greenfield, the 
Seventh Circuit found that an underground school newspaper explaining 
how to hack into the school’s computer system and urging students to do so 
had the potential to disrupt school activities.44 The article explained how to 
figure out faculty passwords and promised to provide further hacking tips in 
the future.45 The Seventh Circuit held that the article was an explicit 
blueprint and form of encouragement.46 
C. The True Threat Standard as Applied to Public Schools 
In addition to the Tinker substantial disruption test, the true threat 
standard has been used to evaluate student speech. Watts v. United States 
was the first Supreme Court case to contemplate the nature of a true 
threat.47 The case considered whether the petitioner had violated a statute 
that prohibited threats to take the life of or inflict bodily harm upon the 
President of the United States.48 The alleged threat was made at a public 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Id. at 989-90. 
 38. Id. 
 39. 642 F.3d 334, 339-41 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 40. Id. at 340. 
 41. Id. at 341. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 348-49. 
 44. 134 F.3d 821, 822, 828 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 45. Id. at 822. 
 46. Id. at 828. 
 47. See 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam). 
 48. Id. at 705. 
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rally by an eighteen-year-old man.49 While not clearly defining a true threat, 
Watts indicated that factors for courts to consider include context, the 
conditional nature of the speech, and whether the speech was made in the 
course of political debate.50 Lower courts have been left to articulate the 
proper standard. As this survey of cases indicates, when student speech is at 
issue, the line between mere expressive rhetoric and a true threat is often 
difficult to decipher. 
True threat evaluations in public schools often consider how a reasonable 
person would interpret the speech. In Doe v. Pulaski County Special School 
District, the Eighth Circuit held that a student’s letter expressing his desire 
to kill an ex-girlfriend constituted a true threat.51 Although the letter itself 
was not personally delivered to the ex-girlfriend, the court found important 
that the student had shared the letter with a fellow classmate.52 The student 
knew this classmate would likely inform the targeted ex-girlfriend.53 
Furthermore, the student admitted to the ex-girlfriend that he had written 
the letter about killing her.54 The Eighth Circuit held that the letter was a 
true threat because a reasonable person would interpret it that way.55 The 
language was explicit, unconditional, and specifically directed at the ex-
girlfriend.56 In Lovell ex rel. Lovell v. Poway Unified School District, the 
Ninth Circuit held that a student could be punished under the true threat 
standard for telling her guidance counselor that she would shoot her unless 
she changed her class schedule.57 A reasonable person would interpret the 
language as a true threat.58 While considering the backdrop of recent school 
violence, the Ninth Circuit also focused on the fact that the threat was 
specific and unequivocal.59 
In addition to reasonable person inquiries, true threat jurisprudence in 
public schools has focused largely on broad factors and the totality of 
circumstances. In In re Douglas D., the Supreme Court of Wisconsin found 
that a violent story had been written for a creative writing class and 
contained “hyperbole and attempts at jest”; thus, it could not constitute a 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Id. at 706. 
 50. Id. at 708. 
 51. 306 F.3d 616, 626 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
 52. Id. at 624. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 625. 
 55. Id. at 626. 
 56. Id. at 625. 
 57. 90 F.3d 367, 368, 373 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 58. Id. at 372. 
 59. Id. 
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true threat.60 Furthermore, there was no evidence that the student had made 
threats in the past or “had a propensity to engage in violence.”61 In D.G. v. 
Independent School District No. 11, a high school student wrote a poem 
expressing her desire to kill her teacher.62 The Northern District of 
Oklahoma considered factors such as the prevalence of school violence, a 
psychologist’s opinion that the poem was merely expressive in nature, and 
the fact that the student did not have a history of violence.63 The court held 
that the poem was not a true threat.64 
In Boman v. Bluestem Unified School District No. 205, the District of 
Kansas considered the fact that a student had a history of artistic 
expression, yet no record of violence, when evaluating a violent poster 
created and displayed by the student.65 The characters depicted in the poster 
were fictional.66 Furthermore, the student created the poster in class and 
made no attempt to conceal it.67 In Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, a 
student’s violent website was not considered a true threat.68 The student 
created the website, which contained a list of individuals he wished would 
die, because he was bored.69 The student did not intend for anyone to view 
the website, and it was meant to be humorous, as indicated by a 
disclaimer.70 
In Latour v. Riverside Beaver School District, violent rap lyrics were at 
issue.71 A student wrote the lyrics at home and never brought them to 
school.72 The lyrics contained metaphorical language, the school itself did 
not take action immediately, and the student did not have a history of 
violence.73 Furthermore, the lyrics were not directly communicated to the 
alleged targets, and they did not feel threatened when they learned of the 
lyrics.74 Thus, the Western District of Pennsylvania did not find a true 
                                                                                                                 
 60. 2001 WI 47, ¶ 39, 243 Wis. 2d 204, 626 N.W.2d 725, 741. 
 61. Id. ¶ 37, 243 Wis. 2d at 234, 626 N.W.2d at 741. 
 62. No. 00-C-0614-E, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12197, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 21, 2000). 
 63. Id. at *13-14. 
 64. Id. at *15. 
 65. No. 00-1034-WEB, 2000 WL 297167, at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2000). 
 66. Id. at *2. 
 67. Id. at *1. 
 68. 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 786 (E.D. Mich. 2002). 
 69. Id. at 781-82. 
 70. Id. at 786. 
 71. No. Civ.A. 05-1076, 2005 WL 2106562, at * 1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2005). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at *2. 
 74. Id. 
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threat.75 In contrast, in Jones v. Arkansas, the totality of circumstances led 
to a determination that violent rap lyrics were a true threat.76 The writer had 
a criminal background and delivered the lyrics personally to the alleged 
victim, and the threat was explicit and immediate as opposed to 
conditional.77 The target believed that the student was capable of carrying 
out the threat because he had spent time in a juvenile detention facility.78 As 
exemplified by these cases, true threat determinations consider the totality 
of circumstances and analyze numerous factors. 
D. Off-Campus Internet Speech in High Schools: Layshock ex rel. 
Layshock v. Hermitage School District and J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue 
Mountain School District 
In addition to deciphering true threats and predicting substantial 
disruptions, and in light of rampant social media use, courts have struggled 
to articulate the proper First Amendment standard for Internet speech that 
originates off-campus. In 2011, the Third Circuit became the highest court 
to decide a case regarding a school’s authority over off-campus Internet 
speech. A rare en banc hearing was held to resolve the issue because in 
2010, two different three-judge panels of the court reached conflicting 
opinions.79 
In Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District, the three-
judge panel of the Third Circuit affirmed a district court ruling in favor of a 
student who, while off-campus, created a fake MySpace page for his high 
school principal.80 The profile contained inaccurate and inappropriate 
information about the principal’s personal life.81 The profile was widely 
viewed and prompted the creation of similar parody profiles.82 The Third 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Id. 
 76. 64 S.W.3d 728, 736 (Ark. 2002). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. at 730, 736. 
 79. Compare J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 291, 308 
(3d Cir. 2010) (finding that a student’s First Amendment rights were not violated when she 
was suspended for creating a fake MySpace profile from a home computer which alleged 
that her principal was a sex addict and pedophile), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 650 F.3d 915 
(3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012), with Layshock ex rel. 
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 252-53, 263 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding that a 
student’s First Amendment rights were violated when he was punished for creating a fake 
and inappropriate MySpace profile for his principal while off-campus), aff’d in part, 650 
F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 80. 593 F.3d at 251-52, 263. 
 81. Id. at 252-53. 
 82. Id. at 253. 
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Circuit panel’s opinion held that it would be “dangerous precedent to 
allow” a school “to reach into a child’s home and control [his] actions there 
to the same extent” that it can while the child is on-campus.83 In contrast, in 
J.S ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, a Third Circuit three-
judge panel affirmed the Middle District of Pennsylvania’s ruling in favor 
of the school district when a high school student was suspended for using 
an off-campus computer to create a fake MySpace profile for her 
principal.84 The profile alleged that the principal was a pedophile and sex 
addict.85 The profile was initially public but was eventually made private; 
thus, access was limited.86 However, the Third Circuit relied on the 
foreseeable substantial disruption prong of Tinker to justify regulation of 
speech that occurred off-campus and online, reasoning that numerous 
members of the middle school community viewed and discussed the 
profile.87 Several students approached the teachers and the principal 
regarding the profile and a breakdown in discipline was apparent after 
creation of the profile.88 
These conflicting opinions were resolved when J.S. was reversed and 
Layshock was affirmed, both en banc.89 In deciding to reverse the prior J.S. 
decision, the en banc court found that the J.S. record lacked any facts that 
would predict a substantial disruption.90 The profile did not identify the 
principal by name or location, and the profile was “so juvenile and 
nonsensical that no reasonable person could take its content seriously.”91 
The court explained that the student “did not even intend for the speech to 
reach the school” and took precautions to ensure that the profile remained 
private.92 The court suggested that the school district’s response to the off-
campus speech actually exacerbated the situation.93 While not explicitly 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Id. at 260. 
 84. 593 F.3d at 290. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 292. 
 87. Id. at 300-01. 
 88. Id. at 300. 
 89. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 933 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage 
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 90. J.S., 650 F.3d at 930-31. 
 91. Id. at 929. 
 92. Id. at 930. 
 93. Id. at 931. 
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deciding whether Tinker applies to off-campus speech, the Third Circuit 
strongly implied that it does not.94 
Furthermore, even if off-campus speech is subject to school regulation, it 
will be scrutinized and subjected to a high threshold. In affirming Layshock 
en banc, the Third Circuit reiterated that a public school cannot censor 
speech unless it meets one of the established exceptions.95 The court did not 
address Tinker directly because the school district did not argue the issue.96 
However, the Third Circuit affirmed that allowing a school to punish off-
campus, non-disruptive speech would be dangerous precedent.97 In sum, 
both Layshock and J.S. indicate a growing reluctance to punish off-campus, 
online speech in high schools. 
E. First Amendment Rights in Public Universities 
Numerous cases have recognized that college students retain their full 
First Amendment rights in public universities. In Healy v. James, the 
Supreme Court found that a public college violated First Amendment rights 
by refusing to recognize a campus chapter of Students for a Democratic 
Society.98 The Court asserted, “[S]tate colleges and universities are not 
enclaves immune from the sweep of the First Amendment.”99 The Court 
also held that First Amendment rights on college campuses should be 
afforded the same degree of protection they receive when exercised in the 
community at large.100 
In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court held that a guest 
speaker at a public university could refuse to answer the New Hampshire 
attorney general’s questions regarding both his political associations and a 
controversial political speech he had delivered on campus.101 Justice 
Frankfurter’s concurrence emphasized that universities were designed “to 
provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Id. at 930-31 (taking into consideration the fact that the student took steps to make 
the profile private and did not intend for the speech to reach the school). 
 95. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 211-14 (3d Cir. 
2011) (en banc) (reviewing the Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse exceptions to Tinker’s 
general rule disallowing speech-based student punishment), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 
(2012). 
 96. Id. at 216. 
 97. Id. 
 98. 408 U.S. 169, 170, 194 (1972). 
 99. Id. at 180. 
 100. Id. 
 101. 354 U.S. 234, 235, 243-44 (1957). 
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experiment and creation.”102 Furthermore, a sense of freedom is essential 
when pursuing the arts and scientific research.103 Thus, although Sweezy did 
not discuss student speech, it is important precedent because it established 
the proper academic atmosphere for public universities. 
More recently, in McCauley v. University of the Virgin Islands, the Third 
Circuit found provisions of a public university’s speech code 
unconstitutional.104 The court pointed to the distinction between the limited 
First Amendment rights afforded to high school students and the broad 
rights enjoyed by college students.105 The court stated that “[p]ublic 
university ‘administrators are granted less leeway in regulating student 
speech than are public elementary or high school administrators’”106 and, 
“At a minimum, the teachings of Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, Morse, and 
other decisions involving speech in public elementary and high schools, 
cannot be taken as gospel in cases involving public universities.”107 
Similarly, in DeJohn v. Temple University, the Third Circuit enjoined the 
university from enforcing a broad harassment policy because it prohibited 
an array of protected speech that would not constitute a substantial 
disruption.108 As later reflected in McCauley,109 DeJohn noted important 
differences in the pedagogical goals of high schools and universities.110 In 
conclusion, courts have long recognized that First Amendment rights in 
public universities deserve greater protection than primary and secondary 
student speech. 
III. Tatro v. University of Minnesota: The Minnesota Supreme Court Fails 
to Clarify Proper Application of the True Threat and Tinker Tests 
A. Facts 
Amanda Tatro was a mortuary student at the University of Minnesota.111 
Upon enrollment, Tatro attended an orientation program, which addressed 
                                                                                                                 
 102. Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result) (quoting THE OPEN UNIVERSITIES 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 11 (Witwatersrand Univ. Press 1957)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 103. Id. 
 104. 618 F.3d 232, 253 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 105. Id. at 242 (citing DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 314-15 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
 106. Id. (quoting DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 316). 
 107. Id. at 247. 
 108. 537 F.3d at 317, 320. 
 109. See McCauley, 618 F.3d at 242. 
 110. DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 315. 
 111. Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811, 814 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d on other 
grounds, 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012). 
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proper student conduct, and “signed a disclosure form indicating that 
she . . . agreed to abide by the [university’s] rules.”112 In November and 
December 2009, Tatro posted comments on her private Facebook page 
asserting that she was looking forward to taking out her aggression during 
an upcoming embalming session.113 Furthermore, Tatro claimed that she 
“want[ed] to stab a certain someone in the throat with a trocar” and 
intended to spend the weekend updating her “Death List.”114 A fellow 
mortuary student became concerned about the comments and alerted school 
administrators.115 University police were notified, and Tatro was not 
allowed to return to class until the police concluded that no crime had been 
committed.116 
In 2010, a panel from the campus committee on student behavior issued 
a disciplinary decision.117 Tatro was found responsible for violations of the 
university rules relating to the mortuary program, the anatomy lab, and the 
anatomy-bequest program disclosure form.118 Tatro received a failing grade 
in one course.119 The committee “requir[ed] her to enroll in a clinical ethics 
course; write a letter to . . . faculty addressing the issue of respect . . .; and 
complete a psychiatric evaluation.”120 The committee also placed her “on 
academic probation for the remainder of her undergraduate career.”121 Tatro 
appealed to the university provost, who upheld the sanctions.122 Tatro then 
challenged the university’s decision, contending “that a university may only 
limit or discipline student speech that constitutes a ‘true threat.’”123 She 
alleged “that the university’s rules did not authorize the university to act 
and that its actions were arbitrary, lacked evidentiary support, and violated 
her constitutional right to free speech.”124 
  
                                                                                                                 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. “A trocar is an instrument used during embalming that has a long hollow needle 
with a sharp end, used to aspirate fluids and gases out of the body.” Id. at 814 n.3. 
 115. Id. at 814. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 815. 
 118. See id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 820. 
 124. Id. at 815. 
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B. The Minnesota Court of Appeals Holding 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the university’s decision.125 
Tatro claimed that her Facebook posts were created off-campus and that the 
university thus lacked authority to punish her for the comments.126 The 
Minnesota Court of Appeals, however, held that the university was 
authorized to apply the student code to off-campus conduct that “has an 
adverse effect on a substantial university interest and indicates potential 
danger” to others.127 The court rejected Tatro’s argument that a university 
could not punish student speech unless it constituted a true threat and held 
that it would not depart from Tinker and its progeny.128 The court reasoned 
that student speech “need not reach the true-threat threshold before a public 
school” can take action.129 The court also saw no practical reason for a 
distinction between speech standards in universities and high schools.130 
The court asserted that “state colleges and universities ‘are not enclaves 
immune from the sweep of the First Amendment.’”131 The court, however, 
also stated that “‘the constitutional rights of students in public school are 
not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.’”132 
While affirming that disruptions may look different at the university 
level, the court stated that “these differences do not per se remove the 
Tinker line of cases from the analysis.”133 In determining that there had, in 
fact, been a substantial disruption, the court recognized that faculty 
members and students had expressed concerns about Tatro.134 One teacher 
in particular believed the comments were directed toward him because he 
had recently had a disagreement with Tatro over a parking space.135 After 
affirming the finding of a substantial disruption, the court discussed the 
negative effect Tatro’s comments could potentially have on the integrity of 
the mortuary program.136 The court emphasized that the particular academic 
program relied heavily on the continued faith of cadaver donors.137 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Id. at 813-14. 
 126. Id. at 816. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 820-21. 
 129. Id. at 821. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 820 (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972)). 
 132. Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)). 
 133. Id. at 821. 
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C. The Minnesota Supreme Court Holding 
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the appeals court’s 
decision on the free speech issue, but used a different analysis.138 The state 
supreme court declined to apply Tinker because it did not meet the purpose 
of the university’s sanctions.139 The university disciplined Tatro because 
her Facebook posts violated the mortuary program’s rules, not because they 
created a substantial disruption.140 The university did not violate Tatro’s 
free speech rights because the program rules were narrowly tailored and 
directly related to established professional conduct standards.141 Upon 
enrollment in the program, Tatro signed an agreement that she would 
comply with the program rules.142 The rules “prohibited ‘blogging’ about 
the anatomy lab or cadaver dissection.”143 Furthermore, “[t]he instructor for 
the anatomy lab course testified that ‘blogging’ was intended to be a broad 
term” and that students were told “during orientation that blogging included 
Facebook and Twitter.”144 The Minnesota Supreme Court emphasized that 
its “decision [was] based on the specific circumstances of [the] case.”145 
IV. Analysis 
By affirming Tatro v. University of Minnesota on narrow grounds, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court missed an opportunity to correct the appellate 
court’s misunderstanding regarding proper application of the true threat and 
Tinker tests. Furthermore, the Minnesota Supreme Court failed to provide 
guidance to universities concerned about maintaining both student safety 
and First Amendment freedoms. The true threat test should be used to 
evaluate college student speech. The Tinker test was designed to only assess 
the speech of primary and secondary students and is premised on the in loco 
parentis theory; thus, it is inapplicable in the university context. 
Furthermore, pure application of Tinker constrains a school because it 
demands a narrow analysis. The true threat standard should be used because 
it requires a predictive, multifactor analysis and allows for quick and 
                                                                                                                 
 138. Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 521 (Minn. 2012). 
 139. Id. at 519-20. 
 140. Id. at 520. 
 141. Id. at 521, 524. 
 142. Id. at 512. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 524. 
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decisive action. Despite misconceptions, the true threat standard is 
proactive and allows for preventive university measures. 
A. The Substantial Disruption Test Is Not Applicable at the University Level 
Because It Was Created for Primary and Secondary Students 
The substantial disruption test should not be applied at the university 
level. The court of appeals in Tatro quoted Bethel School District No. 403 
v. Fraser in its determination “that ‘the constitutional rights of students in 
public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in 
other settings.’”146 However, the appellate court ignored the fact that most 
college students are adults and should not be treated as juveniles. The court 
recognized the correct view that adults are afforded a higher degree of First 
Amendment protection, while it simultaneously failed to apply this 
standard. By declining to depart from Tinker and its progeny, the court 
ignored precedent and well-informed rationale. 
The Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse tests were articulated with 
primary and secondary students in mind. The in loco parentis theory is 
premised on the idea that primary and secondary schools are to prepare 
students for citizenship and instill them with manners and civility.147 Thus, 
administrators are to stand in the shoes of the parent in order to protect and 
nurture minors who lack maturity and are incapable of making informed 
decisions. In contrast, universities are charged with providing intellectual 
challenge and stimulation; the Supreme Court has held that university 
“[s]cholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and 
distrust.”148 In McCauley v. University of the Virgin Islands, the Third 
Circuit outlined these differing roles and reprimanded the district court for 
                                                                                                                 
 146. Tatro, 800 N.W.2d 811, 820 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 
403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)), aff’d on other grounds, 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 
2012). 
 147. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 (“The process of educating our youth for citizenship in 
public schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must 
teach by example the shared values of a civilized social order.”); id. at 684 (“These cases 
recognize the obvious concern on the part of parents, and school authorities acting in loco 
parentis, to protect children—especially in a captive audience—from exposure to sexually 
explicit, indecent, or lewd speech.”); see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 419 (2007) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“Several points are clear: (1) Under in loco parentis, speech rules 
and other school rules were treated identically; (2) the in loco parentis doctrine imposed 
almost no limits on the types of rules that a school could set while students were in school; 
and (3) schools and teachers had tremendous discretion in imposing punishments for 
violations of those rules.”). 
 148. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). 
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its assumption that Tinker was applicable to universities.149 While a 
university certainly has a duty to protect students from threats and violence, 
it is not required to shield students from mere disruptive conduct.150 Yet, 
this is the precise goal of the Tinker substantial disruption test. 
B. Pure Application of the Substantial Disruption Test Is Problematic and 
Ultimately Counterproductive to a University’s Interests 
Although the standard has been manipulated, a pure application of the 
Tinker substantial disruption test should focus solely on how speech will 
affect the educational process. In such an application, only factors related to 
the speech itself should be considered when attempting to predict a 
potential substantial disruption.151 The Minnesota Court of Appeals in Tatro 
was reluctant to depart from the Tinker standard, and implied that the 
substantial disruption standard alone would provide the school with 
flexibility and discretion.152 The court misconstrued the parameters of the 
test, however, and failed to recognize that proper application of the standard 
does not focus on speaker characteristics, general context, or other helpful 
factors, thus eliminating an entire realm of potential insights. Thus, Tinker 
is counterproductive to a university seeking to prevent potential violence. 
The landmark Tinker decision itself encouraged pure application of the 
substantial disruption test. The Supreme Court chose not to inquire into the 
backgrounds and personal characteristics of Mary Beth and John Tinker.153 
The Court did not discuss whether the students had caused disruption in the 
                                                                                                                 
 149. 618 F.3d 232, 242-48 (3d Cir. 2010). The court added: 
We reach this conclusion in light of the differing pedagogical goals of each 
institution, the in loco parentis role of public elementary and high school 
administrators, the special needs of school discipline in public elementary and 
high schools, the maturity of the students, and, finally, the fact that many 
university students reside on campus and thus are subject to university rules at 
almost all times. 
Id. at 242-43. 
 150. See id. at 243, 248. 
 151. Shannon M. McMinimee, Note, LaVine v. Blaine School District: Fear Silences 
Student Speech in the Ninth Circuit, 77 WASH. L. REV. 545, 566 (2002) (“The factors used to 
support a forecast of disruption are limited to factors used to evaluate the potential effect of 
the speech itself, such as past disturbances occurring as a result of the type of speech in 
question.”). 
 152. Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811, 821 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (“And most 
courts hold that student expression need not reach the true-threat threshold before a public 
school may take appropriate disciplinary action in the interest of protecting the work and 
safety of its community.”), aff’d on other grounds, 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012). 
 153. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). 
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past or exhibited other traits that would indicate a tendency to cause 
commotion. Even more importantly, the Court did not analyze the potential 
effect of the armbands against the tumultuous political background of the 
late 1960s. Instead, the Court only considered the fact that the armbands 
were no more than two inches wide, were used to express political beliefs, 
and caused mere discussion among students.154 If the Court had envisioned 
a broader inquiry regarding potential substantial disruption, one would 
assume that it would have pointed to relevant factors in its watershed case 
regarding student speech. 
More recent cases also suggest a pure application of the Tinker 
substantial disruption test. It is important to note that pure application of 
Tinker does not require proof that the speech in question has caused 
disruption in the past. Schools are simply restrained and required to 
consider a narrow realm of relevant factors. For example, in Barr v. Lafon, 
the Sixth Circuit focused on specific instances associated with the message 
behind the Confederate flag.155 Racial graffiti and “hit lists” were not at all 
divorced from the Confederate flag symbol.156 The Sixth Circuit did not 
inquire into the student’s background or discuss recent instances of racially 
motivated violence in nearby school districts.157 Similarly, in Doninger v. 
Niehoff, the Second Circuit focused on the language of the student’s blog, 
its misleading information, and its call to action.158 The court avoided 
consideration of the student’s personal reputation or background.159 
Pure application of Tinker demands consideration of only those factors 
related to the speech itself because only those factors are helpful in 
predicting substantial disruptions. A narrow focus forces the school to 
isolate the speech and its potential effects. Broad considerations are likely 
to distract the school from truly focusing on the probability of disruption. 
While broad considerations may be relevant in a threat analysis, a student’s 
background and general outbreaks of school violence around the country 
have nothing to do with the potential disruptive effect of specific speech 
under Tinker. The Ninth Circuit made this mistake in LaVine v. Blaine 
School District by focusing on non-relevant factors such as nearby 
violence, recent family issues, and the student’s psychological history.160 
                                                                                                                 
 154. See id. 
 155. 538 F.3d 554, 567 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 156. Id. at 566-67. 
 157. See id. 
 158. See 642 F.3d 334, 348 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 159. See id. 
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The court even considered the fact that the student reportedly stalked an ex-
girlfriend, a logical consideration under the true threat standard, but a factor 
unrelated to the poem’s potential for educational disruption.161 
In sum, the Minnesota Court of Appeals suggested that the substantial 
disruption test was appropriate in the university context.162 However, this 
standard has little predictive value and is counterproductive to university 
interests when student safety is a concern. By not correcting this 
misunderstanding, the Minnesota Supreme Court left university officials 
with an incorrect view of the Tinker standard’s capabilities. 
C. The True Threat Test Is the Appropriate Standard for College Speech 
1. The True Threat Standard Allows for a Multifactor Analysis Which 
Has Substantial Predictive Value 
In contrast to the constraints of a pure substantial disruption test, the true 
threat doctrine lends itself to a multifactor, detailed analysis that has greater 
predictive value when violence is a concern. In Lovell v. Poway Unified 
School District, the Ninth Circuit stated that “‘[a]lleged threats should be 
considered in light of their entire factual context, including the surrounding 
events and the reaction of the listeners.’”163 Furthermore, in United States v. 
Dinwiddie, the Eighth Circuit provided a number of factors relevant to a 
true threat analysis.164 These factors include the reaction of the recipient, 
“whether the threat was communicated directly,” and, among others, 
“whether the victim had reason to believe that the maker of the threat had a 
propensity to engage in violence.”165 The true threat analysis in the 
educational context should focus on the likelihood that the threat will 
transpire. Thus, in contrast to the Tinker substantial disruption test, the true 
threat test allows analysis of broad factors unrelated to the speech itself. 
Furthermore, because the consequences of a threat are serious, 
consideration of all potentially relevant information is warranted. This 
tradeoff is not warranted when mere educational disruption is the concern. 
The true threat standard’s multifactor analysis requires that the predictive 
value of each specific factor be weighed and afforded proper consideration. 
Analyzing a criticism of the true threat standard exemplifies how this 
                                                                                                                 
 161. See id. at 989. 
 162. See Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811, 821 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d on 
other grounds, 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012). 
 163. 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. 
Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
 164. See 76 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 165. Id. 
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balance is achieved and maintained. Critics are quick to condemn general 
consideration of school violence around the country,166 a factor that the true 
threat standard allows in its analysis. Indeed, Lovell states that “[i]n light of 
the violence prevalent in schools today, school officials are justified in 
taking very seriously student threats against faculty or other students.”167 
Many fear that this factor would be given undue weight and would lead to 
fear based decisions.168 However, the Eighth Circuit has emphasized that 
the presence or absence of any one element is not dispositive for the true 
threat standard.169 
Furthermore, courts that have used the multifactor true threat test have 
done so with admirable success and have remained committed to the idea 
that First Amendment rights should never depend on the political or social 
climate alone. In Lovell, the Ninth Circuit considered the increasing 
prevalence of school violence.170 However compelling the considered 
school violence statistics may have been, the factor did not dominate the 
analysis because the Ninth Circuit emphasized that a reasonable person’s 
reaction to the alleged threat must also be considered.171 In addition, the 
specificity and unequivocal nature of the speech were considered.172 
Likewise, although Bauer v. Sampson involved the speech of a community 
college professor, as opposed to a student, the case illustrated correct 
application of the multifactor analysis and proper weighing of various 
factors.173 In addition to a turbulent campus community, the Ninth Circuit 
considered the political nature of the professor’s speech, former verbal 
incidents, and the speaker’s lack of past physical violence both on and off 
                                                                                                                 
 166. See, e.g., LaVine ex rel. LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 279 F.3d 719, 728 (9th Cir. 
2002) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“Constitutional law ought 
to be based on neutral principles, and should not easily sway in the winds of popular 
concerns, for that would make our liberty a weak reed that swayed in the winds.”); Robert D. 
Richards & Clay Calvert, Columbine Fallout: The Long-Term Effects on Free Expression 
Take Hold in Public Schools, 83 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1095 (2003) (“It could be that [the 
school shooting at] Columbine provided a ready excuse to justify restricting other forms of 
disagreeable student expression, not simply those with an allegedly violent theme or 
intimation.”). 
 167. Lovell, 90 F.3d at 372 (applying the true threat standard). 
 168. See sources cited supra note 166. 
 169. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 925 (“This list [of factors] is not exhaustive, and the presence 
or absence of any one of its elements need not be dispositive.”). 
 170. Lovell, 90 F.3d at 372 & n.4 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 619 
(1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
 171. Id. at 372. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See 261 F.3d 775, 779, 783-84 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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campus.174 Thus, a single factor did not dominate the analysis.175 The true 
threat standard’s multifactor analysis has predictive value and ensures that a 
single factor does not distort the analysis. Thus, the true threat test, as 
opposed to the Tinker substantial disruption test, should be used when 
student safety is a concern at the university level. The Minnesota Supreme 
Court in Tatro should have clarified the capabilities of this test. 
2. Unlike the Substantial Disruption Test, the True Threat Standard 
Allows for Quick and Decisive Action 
The substantial disruption test delays and complicates a school’s ability 
to act. To begin with, Layshock and J.S. indicate a growing reluctance to 
punish even off-campus high school speech under the substantial disruption 
test.176 Both cases implied that if a school desires to punish off-campus 
speech under Tinker, it will have to meet a high disruption threshold.177 In 
addition, the Tinker analysis is time consuming and complicated because it 
requires a school to anticipate whether speech will substantially interfere 
with the work of the school.178 When predicting substantial disruption, a 
school should focus on factors related to the speech itself. As exemplified 
by Barr v. Lafon, deciphering these factors will likely be fact intensive and 
require extensive research.179 In Barr, the Sixth Circuit compiled a tedious 
record to determine whether the school’s forecast of a substantial disruption 
regarding a Confederate flag was reasonable.180 The court analyzed specific 
racially motivated fights, confrontations, slurs, “hit lists,” and even 
absentee rates among African American students.181 In addition to being 
time consuming, there will almost always be debate regarding whether the 
factors are, in fact, related to the speech at hand. 
                                                                                                                 
 174. Id. at 783-84. 
 175. See id. 
 176. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 933 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage 
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 177. J.S., 650 F.3d at 933 (“Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever allowed 
schools to punish students for off-campus speech that is not school-sponsored or at a school-
sponsored event and that caused no substantial disruption at school.”); Layshock, 650 F.3d at 
216 (“Nevertheless, the concept of the ‘school yard’ is not without boundaries and the reach 
of school authorities is not without limits.”). 
 178. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). 
 179. See 538 F.3d 554, 566-67 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 180. See id. 
 181. Id. 
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In contrast, simple true threat factors such as social climate, student 
background, and general context are quick and easy to ascertain. In 
determining that a student-created poster did not represent a true threat, the 
Boman court relied on quickly decipherable factors such as the fact that the 
poster was created in the context of an art class and that the student did not 
have a history of behavioral problems.182 The absence of a single factor is 
not dispositive;183 thus, a school can move through its analysis without 
having to waste time scrounging for evidence. When student safety is a 
concern, the true threat standard is appropriate because it allows a 
university to react quickly without complication. 
3. The True Threat Standard Is Inherently Proactive; a School Need Not 
Wait for Violence to Occur 
It appears that the Minnesota Court of Appeals, in Tatro, feared that the 
higher threshold associated with the true threat test would prevent the 
university from being proactive.184 Indeed, the court noted: “[M]ost courts 
hold that student expression need not reach the true-threat threshold before 
a public school may take appropriate disciplinary action in the interest of 
protecting the work and safety of its community.”185 However, violence 
prevention was a central component behind formulation of the true threat 
standard.186 Indeed, Virginia v. Black held that one of the rationales behind 
the true threat doctrine was “to protect[] people ‘from the possibility that 
the threatened violence will occur.’”187 We do not punish threats for their 
rhetoric alone. Rather, we punish threats in order to detain individuals 
before they have opportunities to act. 
Despite Black’s indication that a “speaker need not actually intend to 
carry out the threat,”188 in analyzing student threats, courts have scrutinized 
the likelihood that the threatened act will transpire.189 Student threat cases 
are less concerned with punishing threats in order to protect individuals 
from ongoing fear than preventing the disruption that an alleged threat 
                                                                                                                 
 182. Boman v. Bluestem Unified Sch. Dist. No. 205, No. 00-1034-WEB, 2000 WL 
297167, at *2-4 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2000). 
 183. United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 184. See Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811, 821 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d on 
other grounds, 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003). 
 187. Id. at 360 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)). 
 188. Id. 
 189. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 64 S.W.3d 728, 736 (Ark. 2002). 
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conveys.190 While these are admirable goals, pursuing them would lead to 
curtailment of First Amendment rights and chill student speech. Indeed, 
pursuit of these broad goals would give administrators “‘carte blanche to do 
what they want,’” even if the threat is unsupportable and unreasonable.191 
Thus, student threat cases have instead adhered to the well-established 
concept that a threat should be “so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate 
and specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose 
and imminent prospect of execution.”192 Threatening language alone is not 
sufficient for a school to act; there must also be a likelihood of execution. 
Of course, this is not an exact science. We do not expect school 
administrators or courts to make precise predictions. Rather, we ask that 
they use the true threat standard to analyze relevant factors and predict the 
general likelihood that the threat will be carried out. 
For instance, in Boman v. Bluestem Unified School District No. 205, the 
student openly created a violent poster in class.193 Presumably, if the 
student had wanted to avoid early interference with her violent plans, she 
would not have made her intentions known. The student also had a history 
of obscure artistic expression that had never resulted in violence.194 Thus, 
the poster was not a true threat because it was unlikely that violence would 
transpire.195  
Similarly, in In re Douglas D., the Supreme Court of Wisconsin placed 
considerable weight on the fact that the violent story at issue “contain[ed] 
hyperbole and attempts at jest.”196 Humor, as opposed to violence, appeared 
to be the motivation behind the story; thus, it was unlikely that violence 
would result.197 In Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, the Eastern District 
of Michigan determined that a student’s website listing people he wished 
would die was not a true threat.198 The plaintiff created the website “for 
                                                                                                                 
 190. Cf. Andrew P. Stanner, Note, Toward an Improved True Threat Doctrine for 
Student Speakers, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385, 398 (2006) (“Quite apart from the fear and 
disruption that threats themselves may cause, courts seem much more willing to punish 
threats of violence when it seems that such punishment might prevent actual violence.”). 
 191. Elizabeth Bernstein, Schools Struggle With Dark Writings, WALL ST. J. (May 20, 
2008), http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB121124048245705393-he36IPc1fRYvtCSQdD 
KeNCVlOTg_20080618.html?mod=tff_main_tff_top. 
 192. United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 193. No. 00-1034-WEB, 2000 WL 297167, at *1 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2000). 
 194. Id. at *3. 
 195. Id. at *3-4. 
 196. 2001 WI 47, ¶ 39, 243 Wis. 2d 204, 626 N.W.2d 725, 741. 
 197. Id. ¶¶ 37-41, 243 Wis. 2d at 234-37, 626 N.W.2d at 741-42. 
 198. 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 786 (E.D. Mich. 2002). 
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laughs” and never intended for anyone to view it.199 Furthermore, a 
humorous disclaimer warned readers that they should not engage in 
violence as a result of the website’s content.200 In Latour v. Riverside 
Beaver School District, the Western District of Pennsylvania highlighted 
that the school itself did not remove the student from class or contact a 
counselor regarding the feared rap lyrics.201 The school was familiar with 
the student and did not fear that violence would transpire; thus, the speech 
was not a true threat.202 In contrast, a student’s violent lyrics in Jones v. 
Arkansas constituted a true threat because the writer presented the song’s 
content directly to the targeted student, the threat was explicit as opposed to 
conditional, and the writer had a criminal history.203 Thus, a reasonable 
person would expect that the threat would be executed.204 Although 
criminal history is arguably not a reliable indicator, Boman, Latour, and 
Jones all focused on whether the students had histories of violence, a 
further indication that true threat evaluations in the educational context are 
concerned with the likelihood that violence will actually transpire. 
In the educational context, courts have focused on whether threats are 
likely to transpire because not all threats are equal.205 Students often pose 
threats to attract attention or vent frustrations.206 Indeed, in D.G. v. 
Independent School District No. 11, the Northern District of Oklahoma 
found that a student’s poem was not likely to lead to violence because it 
was merely “a way to express her frustration and anger with [her] 
Teacher.”207 
Perhaps we should punish threats regardless of the likelihood of violence 
in order to deter this type of expression. However, this concept implicates a 
whole array of questions regarding the line between expressive and 
threatening language. This would also be an inappropriate university goal. 
Colleges are not responsible for teaching manners and civility. 
Furthermore, denying a forum for expression of these sentiments might be 
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counterproductive and lead to resentment and retaliation. Violent, yet 
cathartic, speech is preferable to violent action. This concept was 
articulated in Judge Kleinfeld’s dissent denying a rehearing en banc in 
LaVine ex rel. LaVine v. Blaine School District.208 Judge Kleinfeld argued 
that “[s]uppression of speech may reduce security as well as liberty.”209 
Thus, we should scrutinize accordingly by using the multifactor true threat 
test and focusing on the likelihood that the threat will transpire. 
Despite the Minnesota Court of Appeal’s implications,210 universities do 
not have to choose between applying Tinker and waiting for students to 
commit violence. The true threat test gives universities a powerful tool to 
predict and prevent potential violence. The Minnesota Supreme Court 
should have explained the advantages of this standard. 
V. Conclusion 
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed Tatro v. University of Minnesota 
on narrow grounds. In doing so, the court missed an opportunity to correct 
the court of appeal’s flawed assumption that Tinker is the applicable 
standard for evaluating college speech. Furthermore, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court failed to explain that the true threat standard can meet 
university needs when safety is a concern. First, the Tinker standard was 
formulated with primary and secondary students in mind and is premised on 
the in loco parentis theory; thus, it is not applicable in the university 
context. Second, pure application of Tinker demands a narrow analysis that 
inhibits a university’s ability to act. Third, the true threat standard would 
have met the university’s needs. The true threat standard allows for a 
predictive, multifactor analysis and makes quick, decisive action possible. 
Furthermore, the true threat standard facilitates preventive measures; thus, a 
university need not wait for violence to transpire. A true threat evaluation 
can meet university needs while still preserving and respecting the role of 
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